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National Commercial Bank
of Scotland v Arcam Demolition & Construction
Ltd & others & Hatherley Hall Ltd [1966] 2
QB 593
Facts:
Judgment was entered by the plaintiff against
several defendants including a Mr Campbell. A
sheriff called to enforce a writ at Campbell's
home. He would not sign walking-possession as
Hatherley Hall Ltd claimed ownership of his
household contents. The sheriff revisited several
times over the next month and then on January 24th
1966 managed to persuade Mrs Campbell to sign the
possession agreement.
The next day her husband wrote to the sheriff's
officer stating that his wife had no authority to
sign.
The sheriff initiated interpleader proceedings
so that the Court could decide Hatherley Hall's
claim to the household contents. They argued that
possession had been abandoned when the wife signed
the agreement, but the Court dismissed the claim
and Hatherley Hall appealed.
Judgment of Lord Denning.
The sheriff could not, of course, sell the goods
until the claim had been determined. So he had to
take out an interpleader summons to determine the
issue. Meanwhile, he had to remain in possession of
the goods: because if he abandoned possession, the
goods would cease to be in the custody of the law:
and the company, Hatherley Hall Ltd., would be able
to take possession of them as purchasers, free of
the claim of the judgment creditor; see Blades v.
Arundale Bagshawes Ltd. v. Deacon.26 Accordingly,
the sheriff, by the bailiff, was under a duty to
retain possession. He invited Mr. Campbell to sign
a document agreeing to walking-possession." But Mr.
Campbell refused to sign it. So the bailiff had to
remain in possession. He did not actually stay in
the house. But he did what was, I think, sufficient
to retain possession. He visited the premises
frequently and made sure that the goods were safely
there and not removed. He did this from December
14th, 1965, to January 24th, 1966. But then
something happened which is said to amount to an
abandonment of possession.
It happened in this way: On January 24, 1966,
the bailiff went to the house. He saw the wife,
Mrs. Campbell. She had a houseful of children there
and did not want the bailiff about the place. The
bailiff told her that she could avoid it by signing
a paper agreeing to give him "walking-possession."
She said she ought to speak to her solicitors, and
then the bailiff said that it did not matter so
long as the furniture was not going to he moved.
She said that she did not want to move the
furniture as she was using it all. She read the
paper and signed it. The bailiff left a copy with
her and went away. When Mr. Campbell came home, he
repudiated what his wife had done. He said that she
had no authority from him to sign the paper: and he
wrote and informed the bailiff. Hatherley Hall Ltd.
wrote to the sheriffs solicitors saying that Mrs.
Campbell had no right to sign anything.
It was at one time thought that, in order to
retain possession, the bailiff, as the sheriffs
officer, must actually remain in the house with the
goods. He used to sit down in the kitchen and make
himself at home. But that has long since been
regarded as unnecessary. It is sufficient if he
visits the house frequently to make sure that the
goods are safely there and not removed. He then
still retains possession. But he need not even do
as much as that he need not visit the house - if he
gets an agreement by some responsible person in the
house to see that the goods are not removed. After
getting such an agreement, he is said to take
walking-possession". This has become so universal a
practice that a form has been prescribed for
"walking-possession" such as to entitle the sheriff
to fees: see the Sheriffs' Fees (Amendment) Order
1956. This form is so framed as to he signed by the
judgment debtor, who would he the person usually in
charge of the goods. It is in these words:
"I hereby request that you will not leave a
bailiff on my premises in close possession of the
goods which you have seized under the above warrant
of execution. If this convenience is allowed to me,
I undertake, pending the withdrawal or satisfaction
of the warrant: - (a) not to remove the said goods
or any portion thereof nor to permit their removal
by any persons unauthorised by you in that behalf;
(b) to inform any county court bailiff or other
persons who may enter my premises for the purpose
of levying any other execution or distress that you
are already in possession of my goods under the
above warrant; (c) to inform you immediately at
your office of the visit of any such county court
bailiff or other persons for the purposes of
levying as aforesaid."
But I do not think it necessary, in point of
law, for the agreement to be made by the judgment
debtor himself. It is sufficient if it is made by
any responsible person in the house. Take the
simple case where the only person in the house is a
caretaker. It would suffice if the caretaker signed
a form saying that he would not permit the goods to
be removed and would inform the bailiff if anyone
tried to remove them. It would not be necessary for
the caretaker to have the authority of the judgment
debtor. So here it was sufficient for the wife to
agree that the goods would not be removed. She was
a responsible person in the house. She could see to
it that the goods were not removed: or, if anyone
attempted to remove them, she could tell the
bailiff. She did not need her husband's authority
for the purpose. The agreement signed by her was
good enough to give "walking-possession," even
though the judgment debtor did not authorise it, or
even objected to it. Once the agreement was signed,
there was no need for the sheriff's officer to
visit the premises every day. He could rely on it
as giving "walking-possession."
In my judgment, the sheriff has never abandoned
possession. The interpleader was properly taken out
and heard and determined: and the sheriff retained
possession meanwhile. The master so held. He went
on to hear the claim of Hatherley Hall Ltd and
decided in favour of the judgment creditor and
barred the claimant, Hatherley Hall Ltd. I think
the master was quite right and I would dismiss this
appeal."
Davies LJ:
"I agree. In Mather on Sheriff and Execution Law
there is reproduced a circular issued by the Lord
Chancellor's department to registrars and high
bailiffs of county courts. The principles
adumbrated in that circular apply with equal force
to the sheriff, and the relevant part of that
circular is in these terms:
"The Lord Chancellor considers that it is to the
public advantage that walking-possession should be
adopted by high bailiffs to the utmost possible
extent, goods being removed or a possession man
being put into close possession only in cases where
it is considered that the course is necessary to
safeguard the goods."
That being the principle, it seems to me that
the course followed by the sheriff in the present
case was eminently proper. What he did was to take
the undertaking from Mrs. Campbell, who was a
responsible person in the house where the goods
were. That course would, of course, be most
convenient to her and her family. It would save
embarrassment and, not only that, it would save
expense which might ultimately have to be met
either by the judgment debtor, her husband, or the
claimants, Hatherley Hall Ltd. In one sense it
might be said that the sheriff took the course of
constituting Mrs. Campbell his agent to safeguard
the goods and to remain in possession of them as
some sort of bailee.
The argument put forward forcibly by Mr. Lewis
in this case seems to be that the only person who
could sign the undertaking which is scheduled to
the Sheriffs' Fees (Amendment) Order, is the
judgment debtor. But if that be right,
walking-possession in this case would have been
impossible, for the judgment debtor, Mr. Campbell,
refused to give the undertaking on the ground that
he was not the owner of the goods. If it be only
the judgment debtor who can sign such an
undertaking, then the claimants, Hatherley Hall
Ltd, could not do so. That would give rise to such
an impasse that the sheriff would have to remain in
close possession.
The further point which is, I think, of great
importance in this case as showing what the
intention of the sheriff was and what the realities
of his actions were is that on the day after he had
received this undertaking from Mrs. Campbell, he
put the matter in the hands of the court in the
sense that he issued his interpleader summons, On
those facts and in the light of those principles,
the contention that the sheriff abandoned
possession is quite an impossible one, and I agree,
therefore, that the appeal fails.
Russell LJ - "I also agree. It is admitted that
the sheriff never intended to abandon possession.
But it is said that the fact, which seems to have
been accepted, that between January 24 and the
hearing of the interpleader summons the sheriff did
not actually visit the premises constituted
abandonment. But this failure to visit is
explicable in a manner inconsistent with
abandonment, because the wife, who was as much in
actual control of the furniture in question as
anyone, had signed this particular document. Here
was, I should have thought, ample factum to add to
the admitted intention. It is, of course, very
rarely that the occasion could occur when the
person signing the walking-possession agreement is
not both the judgment debtor and also the owner of
the goods. I am happy that one can arrive at a
decision which I think it consistent not only with
due process of law but also with common sense. I
venture to read two sentences from the evidence of
Mrs. Campbell herself: "I was signing on behalf of
myself, not on behalf of my husband. He said" -
that is, the sheriff's officer - "it would save him
leaving someone in the house. I had a houseful of
children and did not want that."
Results
1. It explains how walking-possession agreements
work, and concludes any "responsible person" can
sign one, even a spouse
2. A Bailiff can choose such a person to be in
possession
3. The purpose of a walking-possession is
preventing seized goods being removed
4. In contrast to Lumsden v Burnett [1898] and
Lloyds & Scottish Finance Ltd. v Modern Cars
& Caravans (Kingston) Ltd [1966] and H v
Sandwell MBC [1992]
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