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Barclays Bank v O'Brien [1994] 1
AC 180 House of Lords
Mr O'Brien was a chartered accountant and he
also had a shareholding in a company in which he
was an auditor. The company was experiencing
financial difficulty and the bank wished to find
security for the company debts. Mr O'Brien offered
the matrimonial home as security. He told his wife
that the charge was limited to 60,000 and that it
was only to last for a few weeks. Initially the
wife refused to sign but was later persuaded to
sign as the husband told her that the company would
fail if she did not and that her son, who also had
an interest in the company, would lose his home. In
fact the charge was not limited in the amount of
time. The wife agreed to sign the charge. The
manager of the bank had left sent the documents to
their local branch with instructions that the wife
was to be advised of the full extent of the
liability and that the wife should be advised to
take independent advice before signing. However,
the bank clerk got the wife to sign and failed to
carry out the instructions. The bank sought to
enforce the charge and the wife raised undue
influence and misrepresentation in her defence to
have the charge set aside.
Held:
The defence based on undue influence failed
because the wife was held to exercise independence
of thought on financial matters and was used to
dealing with the family finances whilst her husband
was working away. The wife was successful with
regards to misrepresentation. The charge was set
aside as the bank had constructive notice of the
misrepresentation and failed to take reasonable
steps to ensure that the charge had been obtained
without influence or that Mrs O'Brien was aware of
the full extent of liability.
Lord Brown Wilkinson introduced the concept of
constructive notice and set out the steps required
to be taken by banks to avoid being fixed with
constructive notice:
"Therefore in my judgment a creditor is put on
inquiry when a wife offers to stand surety for her
husband's debts by the combination of two factors:
(a) the transaction is on its face not to the
financial advantage of the wife; and (b) there is a
substantial risk in transactions of that kind that,
in procuring the wife to act as surety, the husband
has committed a legal or equitable wrong that
entitles the wife to set aside the transaction.
It follows that unless the creditor who is put
on inquiry takes reasonable steps to satisfy
himself that the wife's agreement to stand surety
has been properly obtained, the creditor will have
constructive notice of the wife's rights.
What, then are the reasonable steps which the
creditor should take to ensure that it does not
have constructive notice of the wife's rights, if
any? Normally the reasonable steps necessary to
avoid being fixed with constructive notice consist
of making inquiry of the person who may have the
earlier right (i.e. the wife) to see whether such
right is asserted. It is plainly impossible to
require of banks and other financial institutions
that they should inquire of one spouse whether he
or she has been unduly influenced or misled by the
other. But in my judgment the creditor, in order to
avoid being fixed with constructive notice, can
reasonably be expected to take steps to bring home
to the wife the risk she is running by standing as
surety and to advise her to take independent
advice. As to past transactions, it will depend on
the facts of each case whether the steps taken by
the creditor satisfy this test. However for the
future in my judgment a creditor will have
satisfied these requirements if it insists that the
wife attend a private meeting (in the absence of
the husband) with a representative of the creditor
at which she is told of the extent of her liability
as surety, warned of the risk she is running and
urged to take independent legal advice. If these
steps are taken in my judgment the creditor will
have taken such reasonable steps as are necessary
to preclude a subsequent claim that it had
constructive notice of the wife's rights. I should
make it clear that I have been considering the
ordinary case where the creditor knows only that
the wife is to stand surety for her husband's
debts. I would not exclude exceptional cases where
a creditor has knowledge of further facts which
render the presence of undue influence not only
possible but probable. In such cases, the creditor
to be safe will have to insist that the wife is
separately advised. |